Let’s now turn to a research question on emergency food aid distributed by the United States so we can practice answering it using the Four Elements of a Persuasive Policy Recommendation. Emergency food aid is a critical component of the United States’ foreign aid efforts, and it is essential to ensure that it is reaching the intended beneficiaries effectively and efficiently. By using GAGAS, we will evaluate the program’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations, determine if the program is achieving its objectives, and assess its overall impact. We hope that this activity will provide you with valuable experience in applying auditing standards and techniques to public policy issues.
For example:
- How could the United States plan to respond to future international food emergencies so that people facing food insecurity receive timely, cost-effective, and appropriate assistance?
Background
In 2016, the US Congress passed the Global Food Security Act to help address food insecurity worldwide. Prior to this, the United States had provided food aid exclusively through the Food for Peace program, offering only agricultural commodities that US farmers grew and US-flagged ships transported overseas. This type of aid is known as “in-kind food aid,” and its original goals were to divest the United States of accumulated agricultural surpluses, improve the domestic food market, and stimulate new food markets overseas.
Starting in 2010, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) introduced “market-based food assistance” to alleviate hunger and improve food security around the world. USAID granted funds to humanitarian organizations to purchase locally or regionally sourced food or distribute cash transfers or food vouchers to those in need. These approaches were meant to complement in-kind food assistance, and by 2016, they were authorized under the Emergency Food Security Program.
The Emergency Food Security Program provides cash aid when in-kind aid cannot arrive soon enough or could potentially disrupt local markets or when it is unsafe to operate in conflict zones. For years, the United States providing only in-kind food aid had been a point of contention for many involved in humanitarian assistance.
Rigorous studies have shown that shipping food from the United States on US-flagged ships is more expensive than providing cash benefits or food vouchers, and in-kind food aid took much longer to arrive than did cash and vouchers. In 2013, economists found that buying food locally or distributing cash or vouchers resulted in a time savings of nearly 14 weeks (a 62 percent gain). Buying grains locally saved more than 50 percent, on average, whereas buying processed commodities was not always cost-effective. The economists concluded that where markets can adequately meet increased demand for food through local and regional procurement, doing so can often yield valuable cost and time savings, allowing donors to reach more recipients faster.
In 2017, for the first time, USAID granted more money for cash transfer and food voucher programs than for in-kind food donations.
Improving the Timeliness, Cost-Effectiveness, and Appropriateness of International Food Aid
Status: What's happening?
Timeliness
- Distributing cash transfers or vouchers (or buying food locally) resulted in a time savings of nearly 14 weeks (a 62 percent gain), according to one study. The study also showed that buying grains locally saved over 50 percent, on average, whereas procuring processed commodities was not always cost-effective.
Cost-Effectiveness
- Cash transfers were least expensive, according to several rigorous studies that compared the relative costs of in-kind food aid, cash transfers, and food vouchers, though most of the studies did not account for the full costs associated with each modality.
- One study of a project in Niger found that food transfers were least expensive overall. Another study, of a project in Malawi, reported mixed results, finding that cash was more cost-effective but that food transfers were more cost-efficient. According to a third study, this one of a project in Bangladesh, did not identify the least expensive modality.
- A study of a food aid project in Yemen reported that recipients of cash transfers bought food items of greater variety and of higher nutritional value, which showed that cash transfers provided significantly greater improvements in dietary quality than did food transfers. The Yemen study also found that food transfers provided higher levels of caloric intake than did cash transfers, which the study’s authors attributed to the relatively inexpensive staples, such as wheat and oil, included in the food transfers.
- A study of a food project in Niger found that food transfers resulted in significantly greater improvements in dietary quality than did cash transfers, which showed that food transfers provided a more varied and higher-quality diet. The researchers attributed this finding to the fact that cash recipients in Niger bought significantly cheaper bulk grains with their transfers than food recipients did. The study’s authors determined that the cash beneficiaries purchased these cheap bulk grains in anticipation of seasonal price increases—stocking up on supplies for the “hungry” season. As a result, the food recipients, who relied on the food transfers provided by the project, had a more varied and higher-quality diet.
Appropriateness
- A study in Ecuador found that, compared with the control group, all recipients of cash transfers, food vouchers, and food transfers experienced significantly improved outcomes in terms of the value and volume of food consumed, caloric intake, and dietary diversity. Similarly, a study in Bangladesh found that all recipients of cash transfers, food transfers, or combinations of the two modalities experienced significantly improved outcomes for value and volume of food and for caloric intake.
- Among six studies that used control groups to examine the value and volume of food provided, five showed statistically significant improvements as a result of receiving all three types of assistance. Similarly, three of the six studies that used control groups to examine caloric intake also found statistically significant improvements for all three modalities.
- A study of a project in Niger comparing the effects of the three modalities found that food transfers provided the greatest dietary diversity, while studies of projects in Malawi, Uganda, and Yemen found that cash transfers provided greater dietary diversity than food transfers.
Criteria: What should be happening?
- American food aid should be timely, cost-effective, and appropriate to the specific conditions and limitations of the area where people are experiencing food insecurity.
Interpretation: Why is the status happening?
- Contextual factors, such as the severity of the food crisis, the capacity of local markets, and changes in those markets, may have contributed to a variety of food security outcomes, showing that no food aid modality consistently outperformed the others.
Outlook: What will likely happen next?
- Until research can provide a clear understanding of when different modalities of food aid should be used and why, based on rigorous data and analysis, we won’t know whether the billions of dollars of aid the United States donates each year will have the desired effects of alleviating hunger and improving food security.
Now imagine that you are working for a client, a nongovernmental organization tasked with administering American food aid efficiently and effectively in parts of the world ravaged by natural disasters or civil wars.
The client wants to know whether it’s best to provide food or cash to those affected. Note that the criteria are not explicitly stated because “what should be happening” is implied (i.e., people affected by natural disasters and civil wars should be efficiently and effectively served by your client).
The annotated paragraph below presents evidence suggesting that the best strategy is to combine the two methods of food aid delivery:
When food aid needs to be administered in countries where inflation is rampant, providing it in the form of cash and food has been shown to be more effective than providing cash alone. In January 2010, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux published the results of a study they conducted on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Their team of researchers conducted a regression analysis on a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The data show specifically that food transfers enabled higher levels of income growth, livestock accumulation, and self-reported food security. This may be partially explained by the fact that the cash transfers that were studied were not indexed, meaning they did not adjust to inflation. A reliance on cash transfers that are not indexed to deliver social protection in an inflationary environment “is not an optimal strategy,” the researchers noted, “because commodity-based transfers retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash transfers is eroded by rising commodity pricing” (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Until nongovernmental organizations are afforded the flexibility to provide food aid in the combined form of cash and food, they may miss out on opportunities to deliver food aid as efficiently and effectively as possible.
When food aid needs to be administered in countries where inflation is rampant, providing it in the form of cash and food has been shown to be more effective than providing cash alone. In January 2010, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux published the results of a study they conducted on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Their team of researchers conducted a regression analysis on a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The data show specifically that food transfers enabled higher levels of income growth, livestock accumulation, and self-reported food security. This may be partially explained by the fact that the cash transfers that were studied were not indexed, meaning they did not adjust to inflation. A reliance on cash transfers that are not indexed to deliver social protection in an inflationary environment “is not an optimal strategy,” the researchers noted, “because commodity-based transfers retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash transfers is eroded by rising commodity pricing” (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Until nongovernmental organizations are afforded the flexibility to provide food aid in the combined form of cash and food, they may miss out on opportunities to deliver food aid as efficiently and effectively as possible.
When food aid needs to be administered in countries where inflation is rampant, providing it in the form of cash and food has been shown to be more effective than providing cash alone. In January 2010, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux published the results of a study they conducted on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Their team of researchers conducted a regression analysis on a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The data show specifically that food transfers enabled higher levels of income growth, livestock accumulation, and self-reported food security. This may be partially explained by the fact that the cash transfers that were studied were not indexed, meaning they did not adjust to inflation. A reliance on cash transfers that are not indexed to deliver social protection in an inflationary environment “is not an optimal strategy,” the researchers noted, “because commodity-based transfers retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash transfers is eroded by rising commodity pricing” (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Until nongovernmental organizations are afforded the flexibility to provide food aid in the combined form of cash and food, they may miss out on opportunities to deliver food aid as efficiently and effectively as possible.
When food aid needs to be administered in countries where inflation is rampant, providing it in the form of cash and food has been shown to be more effective than providing cash alone. In January 2010, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux published the results of a study they conducted on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Their team of researchers conducted a regression analysis on a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The data show specifically that food transfers enabled higher levels of income growth, livestock accumulation, and self-reported food security. This may be partially explained by the fact that the cash transfers that were studied were not indexed, meaning they did not adjust to inflation. A reliance on cash transfers that are not indexed to deliver social protection in an inflationary environment “is not an optimal strategy,” the researchers noted, “because commodity-based transfers retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash transfers is eroded by rising commodity pricing” (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Until nongovernmental organizations are afforded the flexibility to provide food aid in the combined form of cash and food, they may miss out on opportunities to deliver food aid as efficiently and effectively as possible.
When food aid needs to be administered in countries where inflation is rampant, providing it in the form of cash and food has been shown to be more effective than providing cash alone. In January 2010, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux published the results of a study they conducted on Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Their team of researchers conducted a regression analysis on a two-wave panel survey conducted in 2006 and 2008. The data show specifically that food transfers enabled higher levels of income growth, livestock accumulation, and self-reported food security. This may be partially explained by the fact that the cash transfers that were studied were not indexed, meaning they did not adjust to inflation. A reliance on cash transfers that are not indexed to deliver social protection in an inflationary environment “is not an optimal strategy,” the researchers noted, “because commodity-based transfers retain their value whereas the purchasing power of cash transfers is eroded by rising commodity pricing” (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2010). Until nongovernmental organizations are afforded the flexibility to provide food aid in the combined form of cash and food, they may miss out on opportunities to deliver food aid as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Policy writers can get overwhelmed and confused about what to include in the key findings and what not to. I’m sorry to say that I can’t give you a formula to follow here. What I can give you is a bit of advice. The most relevant information to include in a key findings section is information that offers the reader
- evidence, data, and analysis to support your conclusion;
- background, context, and reasoning that make sense of the evidence; and
- consideration—and rebuttal—of divergent points of view.
You’ll know that you have enough information in your key findings section when you have answered the questions you set out to answer with just enough supporting evidence. Sounds simple, but it takes practice.
Discussion of the Policy Recommendation
When the findings are taken all together, it seems to me that the story we’d want to tell is that there is no obvious strategy that will work in every country and in any situation. “The key is flexibility and choice,” says Chris Barrett, a Cornell University economist who has studied US international food assistance. A core problem, he added, is the “one size fits all” approach that the US food aid system has taken historically whereby in-kind aid was the one and only answer to every food security problem. Instead, as Barrett has argued for years, humanitarian assistance organizations should be able to choose among food aid shipped from the United States, food purchased locally or regionally, and vouchers and cash transfers—depending on the situation and specific objectives.
“While agricultural constituencies are reluctant to reform food aid,” says Barrett, with the creation of the Emergency Food Security Program, “we’re effectively moving it into the foreign assistance budget.” Rather than take on farming and shipping lobbyists head on, it seems the United States has been “slowly making the transition, through a back door, from a farm-oriented food-aid policy to a development-oriented one,” Barrett says. “And that’s no bad thing.”
“Thinking that social ills are puzzles that can be solved,” writes Aaron Wildavsky, “instead of problems that may be alleviated or eventually superseded, can make us despondent when they do not yield to our ministrations. A good comparison is to do something, as opposed to nothing, and then evaluate the result. The rub there is that you don’t know whether some other action might have been better or worse. A better comparison is to contrast the problems we have now with those we had before.” We should consider proposed policy solutions, he concludes in Speaking Truth to Power, “not as eternal truths but as hypotheses subject to modification and replacement by better ones until these in turn are discarded.”